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Virtually every attempt by an interstate rail carrier to withdraw all or
any portion of its services over a given route is potentially subject to
the jurisdiction of some federal or state regulatory agency.' Moreover,
although a carrier would find it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve
total abandonment or discontinuance without proof that the service
involved only could be provided at a loss, current national regulatory
policy sometimes requires carriers to continue present operations, losses
2

notwithstanding.
On October 11, 1965, the trustees of the New York, New Haven, and
Hartford Railroad filed a notice and supporting statement, pursuant
to section 13a(l) of the Interstate Commerce Act, of the railroad's intention to discontinue all of its then existing interstate passenger train
operations. 3 Such action would have affected 273 interstate trains providing suburban services between New Haven and New York City, and
Providence and Boston, and through services between Springfield and
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1 Withdrawal of all remaining services over a given portion of a railroad's line is usually
termed "abandonment" or "total abandonment." Withdrawal of only a portion of the
services is usually termed "partial abandonment," "discontinuance," or "partial discontinuance." Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Palmer
v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939); Gulf M. & O.R.R. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
120 F. Supp. 250 (D. La. 1954). However, the court's usage of these terms tends to be
uneven. See Creston Grain & Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 840 (D. Neb.
1963) (withdrawal of all remaining services on a branch line termed "partial abandonment'); Sludden v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1962) (withdrawal of all
passenger service termed both "discontinuance" and "abandonment').
In this article "abandonment" refers to any kind of service withdrawal, "total abandonment" to complete withdrawal of all existing services, and "discontinuance" to withdrawal of some but not all existing services.
2 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910).
3 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 327 I.C.C. 151, 152 (1966).
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New York City, and Boston and New York City. During a typical week
these trains made 1,244 trips, and during 1964 the railroad carried 75.7
million passengers. According to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
in 1964 the New Haven sustained a deficit of $17 million, of which
$10.5 million was attributable to passenger operations. Moreover, the
carrier had sustained losses averaging $11.9 million in every year commencing with 1957. The Commission attributed these losses to a
variety of factors, including financial speculation by the management,
poor locomotive policy, inadequate maintenance of plant and equipment, failure to utilize effectively the railroad's full motor carrier
operating authority, burdensome state and local taxation, and policies
of federal and state governments inequitably promoting competing
forms of transportation.4
After a short investigation, the Commission temporarily blocked all
but a few of the proposed discontinuances. 5 Given the potential economic, social, and political impact of the action proposed by the carrier
on all of southern New England, this result was not a surprising one.
Probably it did not even surprise the New Haven trustees. But to sustain its action, the Commission was forced to ignore its own precedents,
interpret the controlling legislation extremely liberally, make highly
questionable findings of fact, create new substantive standards and
procedural devices, and attempt to fashion novel methods of cooperation between railroads and public authorities. The only result of these
uncharacteristic heroics was a temporary delay, and the entire process
was almost certain to be repeated within less than a year from the decision.
The Commission's agonized response in the New Haven case was the
product of the utter inadequacy of the administrative instruments available to it for the resolution of the passenger service problems of a nationwide, privately owned rail transportation system providing the two
economically disparate commodities of passenger and freight carriage,
intermittently subject to government planning, subsidization, and control, and operating within a complex, changing economy. This article analyzes the economic, political, and legal framework within which
questions of the continuance of specified rail services are presented and
resolved, and points to the inadequacy of that framework. It also suggests alternative approaches for dealing with railroad abandonment
problems.
4 Id. at 163-73.
5 Id. at 225.
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I.

WHY RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE CAUSES PROBLEMS

Among the factors that have contributed to the predicament of rail
passenger service are the economic characteristics of this service, the
structure of American railroads, and the division of responsibility for
the regulation and welfare of the national transportation system among
a large number of authorities, both federal and state. Therefore, it may
be profitable to commence our analysis of the rail passenger problem
with some discussion of the economic and political parameters within
which the problem must be confronted.
Inherent Economic Peculiaritiesof Rail Passenger Service
Rail service, unlike most other goods and services, may become unavailable to particular consumers at any price. To transport one passenger or piece of freight, a railroad must have at least one locomotive,
crew, car, railroad bed and track, and control system. Of course, for
practically the same cost the carrier could accommodate many times
more passengers or pieces of freight. And by attaching a few more cars
to the locomotive or by using the same equipment to make more trips,
the total carriage could be further increased at minimum additional
cost. Given the high costs of locomotives, crews, etc., a substantial
amount of traffic is required to enable a carrier to recover its costs for
any given run. Thus, if the carrier is to operate solely on a paying basis,
a large number of potential customers may be denied all services if the
minimum figure cannot be obtained. Rail services present then a situation in which the opportunity of each consumer to buy a product is dependent upon the whims of the consumer's neighbors in a manner not
usually encountered in our economic life.
Admittedly, railroads are not unique in demanding a very large
input to produce the first unit of product. But the output of most other
heavy industries is transportable, a fact that enables them to accumulate sufficient demand on a worldwide basis. Even electric power, which
because of the large capital input required to provide efficient service
and the expense of duplicating transmission facilities is granted regulated monopoly status, may be transported long distances to remote
users. Railroad services, unfortunately, are totally immobile, and carriers are thus limited to the demand generated in the immediate
vicinity of their tracks. Other "services," such as skiing in the Alps and
enjoying the warmth of Bermuda in February, require more demand
to meet fixed costs than is available in their immediate environs and are
as immobile as the Long Island Railroad; but purchasers of these "ser-
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vices" can be attracted on a worldwide basis in sufficient numbers to
support the costs of the operations. Excepting, perhaps, the San Francisco cable cars and the final trips of defunct passenger trains, rail lines
are not tourist attractions and cannot hope to supplement local demand
with visitors from afar.
The regulatory problem is further complicated by the interdependence of the various parts of a rail system and the ability of the same
equipment to handle both freight and passengers. Rail lines usually
cannot be broken into pieces with service along certain segments of
continuous lines but no service along others. Thus, the feasibility of
service along one portion of a line depends upon the railroad's ability
to achieve given earnings along the rest of the line; and although various communities along the total length of the carrier's run may have
different interests in preserving the service and may be willing to make
different sacrifices to do so, the rail carrier's only choices may be to
provide service to everyone or no one. 6 Finally, although the same
equipment may be able to provide freight and passenger services, the
political, economic, and social interests related to each type of service
are likely to differ substantially.7
Private vs. Public Value
A second important aspect of rail service is that, typically, the value
to the public of a given level of service exceeds the amount that will be
paid by customers to obtain the service. As rail fares increase or auto
travel becomes cheaper or more convenient, more commuters may
prefer to use the highways. If so, at some point the carrier may find
itself unable to recover the costs of providing the service. But when all
the costs connected with the withdrawal of the service and the increased
car usage are totalled, it may appear that it would have been cheaper
for the economy as a whole for the railroad to have continued the
service and the commuter to have left his car at home.8
6 Moreover, the system of rate regulation applicable to railroads adds to the problem.
Under existing practices, a carrier's ability to maximize revenues )by adjusting prices is
limited by the requirement that rates must fit within a general pattern in order to avoid
economic distortions and discrimination between geographic sectors. Thus, the carrier is
often not permitted to adjust the price, if there by any, of certain high-cost services to a
level that would permit operation without loss, since this might create discontinuities and
discriminations within the pricing system. See III-B SHARFMAN, THm INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMMSION 309-768 (1936).
7 For a general discussion of the special features of railroad services, see FROMm, TRANSPORT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT (1965); Baumol, The Role of Cost in the
Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 36 U. CH. J. Bus. 336-51 (1963).
8 For a general discussion of the relationship between financial and social considerations
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Public costs of withdrawing rail service are of several varieties. One
class includes the financial and other damage that may be suffered by
persons and industries who have made economic and personal commitments on the assumption that a service would continue to exist. A
second class includes the indirect costs engendered by increased use of
alternative forms of transportation. A withdrawal of rail service diverts
passengers to airplanes, buses, trucks, and private cars. Rail transportation uses, however, far less land space per passenger-mile than does
rubber wheeled or airborne transportation." Moreover, the employment of rubber wheeled transportation brings with it the high costs of
combatting congestion and air pollution;1 ° and in many areas, particularly the eastern seaboard, the cost of building additional airports adjacent to already overcrowded metropolitan centers is enormous. 1
The Politicaland Administrative Setting of Railroad Regulation
The inherent economic difficulties of rail service are further complicated by the political and administrative setting within which its
problems must be solved. Although railroads are just one of several
competing forms of transportation, no national plan exists for allocating traffic between rail, road, water, and air; nor are there any clear
guidelines to assist agencies that must make decisions in this area.
Moreover, the uncoordinated policies with respect to competing forms
of transportation have been ones of sizeable subsidy, which has made it
even more difficult for the railroads to compete on a price basis. 12 And
although the Interstate Commerce Commission now effectively regusee LoCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 835-37 (5th ed. 1960); III-A SHARFMAN, T]E
INTERSTATE COMMISSION 33246 (1935); Nelson, Pricing Transportation Services, in TRANSPORTATION INVESTMENT & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 198, 209 (1965).
0 Statement of Sec'y of Commerce John Connor, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-17, at 148 (1965).
10 One response to this problem was the recent legislation authorizing research and
demonstration programs on the possibilities of high-speed interurban rail transportation.
79 Stat. 893 (1965), 49 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. I 1965). For a general discussion of the considerations behind the program see Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Transportation
and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., Ser. 89-17 (1965).
11 Washington National Airport is a prime example of overcrowding. As a result the
Federal Aviation Agency has acted to curtail the number of flights into and out of
National. See N.Y. Times, July 12, 1966, p. 31, col. 3.
12 FAINSOD, GORDON & PALAMOUNTAIN, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 3-416
(3d ed. 1959); LoCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION, 823-66 (5th ed. 1960). Section 7
of the act creating the Department of Transportation requires that body to develop criteria
for evaluating national investment in transportation. 80 Stat. 941 (1966), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 1656 (Supp. 1966).
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lates most surface transportation, it has but limited authority over
13
water carriage and none over air carriage.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF ABANDONMENT

As a result of a recent amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act,
(the "Act"), all total abandonments and discontinuances by carriers
operating in interstate commerce are now subject to at least the concurrent jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 14 Until quite
23 Authority over interstate motor transportation was ceded to the ICC by the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1964).
Although partial ICC jurisdiction over water carriage dates back to the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), prior to 1940 the Maritime Commission regulated common carriers in the coastal trade and on the Great Lakes, and common and
contract carriers in the intercoastal trade. 39 Stat. 728 (1916); 47 Stat. 1425 (1933). The
Transportation Act of 1940 transferred jurisdiction over these areas to the ICC and added
other types of shipping. 54 Stat. 929 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1964). However, the same
act exempted from all regulation private carriers, contract carriers whose equipment and
cargoes are so specialized that they do not compete with common carriers, common carriers
whose cargoes consist of not more than three commodities transported in bulk, carriers
of liquid cargoes in bulk in tank vessels, small craft, and ferries operated incidentally by
railroads, motor carriers, or express companies. 54 Stat. 931-33 (1940), 49 U.S.C.
§§ 903(b)-(h) (1964).
Jurisdiction over air transportation is divided between the Federal Aviation Agency
and the Civil Aeronautics Board. 72 Stat. 737 (1958); 75 Stat. 467 (1961); 76 Stat. 143
(1962), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1964). Generally, the Board regulates rates and routes,
and the Agency is responsible for promotion and safety. There is a provision for a joint
board of the CAB and ICC to consider matters relating to through service and joint
rates, fares, and charges. 72 Stat. 791 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1483 (1964).
14 72 Stat. 571 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1964): Discontinuance or change of the operation
.-,'or service of trains or ferries; notice; investigation; hearing; determination.
(1) A carrier or carriers subject to this chapter, if their rights with respect to the discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, of the operation or service of any train or ferry
operating from a point in one State to a point in any other State or in the District of
Columbia, or from a point in the District of Columbia to a point in any State, are subject to any provision of the constitution or statutes of any State or any regulation or order
of (or are the subject of any proceeding pending before) any court or an administrative or
regulatory agency of any State, may, but shall not be required to, file with the Commission, and upon such filing shall mail to the Governor of each State in which such train
or ferry is operated, and post in every station, depot or other facility served thereby, notice
at least thirty days in advance of any such proposed discontinuance or change. The carrier
or carriers filing such notice may discontinue or change any such operation or service
pursuant to such notice except as otherwise ordered by the Commission pursuant to this
paragraph, the laws or constitution of any State, or the decision or order of, or the pendency of any proceeding before, any court or State authority to the contrary notwithstanding. Upon the filing of such notice the Commission shall have authority during said
thirty days' notice period, either upon complaint or upon its own initiative without
complaint, to enter upon an investigation of the proposed discontinuance or change. Upon
the institution of such investigation, the Commission, by orders served upon the carrier
or carriers affected thereby at least ten days pior to the day on which such discontinuance
or change would otherwise become effective, may require such train or ferry to be con-
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recently, however, important categories of service withdrawals were
regulated by the states alone. And in the process of enlarging the
Commission's jurisdiction to embrace all abandonments, Congress has
created serious procedural difficulties and incongruities: the procedures
applicable to discontinuances differ from those applicable to total
abandonments, and the procedures applicable to discontinuances of
services rendered across at least one state line ("interstate discontinuances") differ from those applicable to discontinuances of services
rendered within a single state ("intrastate discontinuances"). Neither
of these distinctions can be justified in terms of the nature of the services involved. In addition, the procedures applicable to interstate
discontinuances seem unduly to impede the Commission's efforts to
tinued in operation or service, in whole or in part, pending hearing and decision in such
investigation, but not for a longer period than four months beyond the date when such
discontinuance or change would otherwise have become effective. If, after hearing in such
investigation, whether concluded before or after such discontinuance or change has become
effective, the Commission finds that the operation or service of such train or ferry is required by public convenience and necessity and will not unduly burden interstate or
foreign commerce, the Commission may by order require the continuance or restoration
of operation or service of such train or ferry, in whole or in part, for a period not to
exceed one year from the date of such order. The provisions of this paragraph shall not
supersede the laws of any State or the orders or regulations of any administrative or regulatory body of any State applicable to such discontinuance or change unless notice as in
this paragraph provided is filed with the Commission. On the expiration of an order by
the Commission after such investigation requiring the continuance or restoration of operation or service, the jurisdiction of any State as to such discontinuance or change shall no
longer be superseded unless the procedure provided by this paragraph shall again be
invoked by the carrier or carriers.
(2) Where the discontinuance or change, in whole or in part by a carrier or carriers
subject to this chapter, of the operation or service of any train or ferry operated wholly
within the boundaries of a single State is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of any
State or where the State authority having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition duly filed with it by said carrier or carriers for authority to discontinue
or change, in whole or in part, the operation or service of any such train or ferry or shall
not have acted finally on such an application or petition within one hundred and twenty
days from the presentation thereof, such carrier or carriers may petition the Commission
for authority to effect such discontinuance or change. The Commission may grant such
authority only after full hearing and upon findings by it that (a) the present or future
public convenience and necessity permit of such discontinuance or change, in whole or in
part, of the operation or service of such train or ferry, and (b) the continued operation or
service of such train or ferry without discontinuance or change, in whole or in part, will
constitute an unjust and undue burden upon the interstate operations of such carrier or
carriers or upon interstate commerce. When any petition shall be filed with the Commission under the provisions of this paragraph the Commission shall notify the Governor
of the State in which such train or ferry is operated at least thirty days in advance of the
hearing provided for in this paragraph, and such hearing shall be held by the Commission
in the State in which such train or ferry is operated; and the Commission is authorized
to avail itself of the cooperation, services, records and facilities of the authorities in such
State in the performance of its functions under this paragraph.
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analyze the factors involved in situations in which carriers are seeking
extensive discontinuances of important services.
The Shift from State to Federal Jurisdiction Over Discontinuances
For more than half a century the inherent inconsistency between the
federal government's power to regulate railroads pursuant to the commerce clause and the states' power to exercise similar authority pursuant to their "police" function and to whatever residual functions are
left them by the tenth amendment has been resolved in favor of almost
complete and exclusive federal (Interstate Commerce Commission)
jurisdiction. 15 But despite manifest constitutional and apparent legislative authority, prior to the 1958 amendment to the Act the Commission had resolved the politically delicate problem of the regulation
of railroad abandonments by limiting its own jurisdiction in accordance with the somewhat dubious "partial abandonment" doctrine. 16
Thus limited, ICC jurisdiction extended only to complete cessations of
all operations by a carrier over a given line. The states were ceded exclusive control over partial abandonments or discontinuances; that is,
those situations in which a railroad eliminated some but not all operations over the relevant line. 17 The logic of the resulting jurisdictional
pattern was undermined, however, by the fact that although the problems attendant upon the total abandonment of all services on a branch
line by a carrier continuing operation in other parts of its system were
largely identical with those attendant upon the withdrawal of part of
the services on a given line, branch line abandonments were reserved
15 See I SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 177-82, 239-44, 282-92
(1981). Thus, the courts have ruled that the Commission was constitutionally and
legislatively empowered to assert jurisdiction over the abandonment of a railway line
wholly located within a single state and physically unconnected with rail lines in any
other state but owned by a carrier operating railway lines beyond the state's borders.
Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926); Illinois v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 83
(N.D. Ill. 1962), afT'd, 373 U.S. 378 (1963).
16 Alabama v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Board of Pub. Util. Comm'n v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 104 (D. N.J. 1957); Gulf M. 8 O.R.R. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
120 F. Supp. 250 (D. La. 1954).
17 This policy was based on the Commission's reading of section 1(18) of the Act.
Public Convenience Application of Kansas City So. Ry., 94 I.C.C. 691 (1925). Although
the courts have never directly challenged the Commission's limitation of its jurisdiction in
this area, neither have they made an independent analysis of the authority and logic
of this proposition. The principal judicial support for the partial abandonment doctrine,
Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939), does no more than cite the Commission's
decision in Kansas City So. Ry. Moreover, this restrictive view of abandonment
jurisdiction would appear inconsistent with the plenary authority successfully asserted
by the Commission over the analagous problems of the regulation of the intrastate freight
and passenger rates of interstate carriers. Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257
U.S. 563 (1922); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Pub. Stat. Util. Comm'n, 245 U.S. 493 (1918);
Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Shreveport case).
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for ICC jurisdiction.' 8 As a result of this complication, a federal strain
of discontinuance law grew up alongside state law.
Further debate regarding the wisdom of the partial abandonment
doctrine was rendered moot by the changes in the Act effected by section 5 of the Transportation Act of 1958 (the "Transportation Act"). 9
Under the Transportation Act, interstate rail carriers are empowered
to substitute federal jurisdiction, as exercised by the ICC, for state
surveillance. Indeed, with regard to some interstate discontinuances
a carrier may now implement its plans without benefit of state or
federal sanction. In addition, the Transportation Act provides standards designed to guide the Commission in exercising its new jurisdiction, and these standards differ at least in form from those applicable
to total abandonments.
Interstate Discontinuances
Interstate discontinuances are now subject to federal jurisdiction in
accordance with section 13a of the Act. 20 Under this section, railroads
contemplating interstate discontinuances must notify the ICC and the
governors of every state in which the train or ferry at issue is operated,
and must post notices in every station or depot served by the line, of
18 Gulf, M. & O.R.R. Abandonment, 290 I.C.C. 701 (1955); New York Cent. R.R.
Abandonment, 254 I.C.C. 745 (1944); Morris & E.R.R. Proposed Abandonment, 175 I.C.C.
49 (1931). ICC jurisdiction also extended to the abandonment of all interstate traffic on
a line maintaining intrastate traffic. Maine Cent. R.R. Abandonment, 207 I.C.C. 97 (1935).
19 72 Stat. 571 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 18a(l) (1964). Actually, section 13a implicitly recognizes
residual state power over discontinuances. Section 1a(1) applies to carriers whose "rights
with respect to . . . discontinuance .. . are subject to any provision of the constitution
or statutes of any State or any regulation or order of ... any court or an administrative
or regulatory agency of any State ..
" Section 13a(2) applies "where the discontinuance
is prohibited by the constitution or statutes of any State or where the State authority
having jurisdiction thereof shall have denied an application or petition ... for authority
to discontinue .... ." Thus, rather than rejecting the partial abandonment doctrine,
Congress seems to be recognizing state jurisdiction over certain withdrawals of rail
services, presumably those withdrawals encompassed by the partial abandonment doctrine.
From this it should follow that absent state jurisdiction the carrier would be free of all
regulation.
20 As an alternative basis for its decision, a three judge court has asserted that a carrier
may invoke section 13a(l) in cases subject to Commission jurisdiction under section 1(18).
Minnesota v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 107 (D. Minn. 1965). This position seems dubious
since jurisdiction under section 13a is limited to situations in which a carrier's rights
with respect to discontinuance are subject to state jurisdiction, and a state has no
jurisdiction over total abandonments within the ambit of section 1(18). See Thompson
v. Texas M. Ry., 828 U.S. 134 (1946).
Section 13a(l) applies to interstate trains also rendering intrastate service. Sludden
v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1962). And in one case the Commission
appeared to apply section 13a(l) to trains crossing state borders which render passenger
service solely within one of the states. See New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 327 I.C.C. 151, 200
(1966).
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the intended changes at least thirty days prior to the effective date
thereof.21 Then, unless within the thirty day period the ICC (either
upon complaint or its own motion) determines that an investigation
22
is necessary, the carrier is free to proceed with the discontinuance.
If an investigation is ordered, the ICC may delay the discontinuance
up to four months pending a hearing and decision. 23 Thereafter, if the
Commission determines that the services in question are required by
public convenience and necessity and that their maintenance will not
unduly burden interstate commerce, the carrier may be ordered to
continue all or some of the services for a period of up to one year from
the date of the Commission's order. Upon the expiration of this period,
the carrier would again be free to file for discontinuance with the appropriate state authorities or to resort again to the mechanism outlined
in this paragraph.
The propriety of empowering rail carriers to discontinue services on
interstate lines without mandatory hearings before any regulatory or
judicial body, state or federal, has been upheld by the courts against
attacks on statutory and constitutional grounds. 24 Admittedly the ability of carriers to discontinue under section 13a(1) without prior approval from any regulatory authority represents a departure from past
practice.2 5 But the cases hold that Congress intended to give the
21 The notice required by the Act does not include publication in the Federal Register.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 463 (1959).
22 The Commission has no power to delay a section 13a(l) proceeding to await the
outcome of state proceedings that might eliminate all remaining service on the line in
question. Louisville & N.R.R. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 173, 175 (1959). And a contractual
obligation by the carrier to continue service does not bar ICC jurisdiction under 13a(1),
New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 327 I.C.C. 151, 199 (1966), although the carrier
would be subject to suit if it violated its contractual obligations.
23 All parties may participate in 13a(1) proceedings without offering a formal pleading
or proving that they have a specific interest in the outcome. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.
Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 79 (1959).
24 In New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1959), af'd per curiam,
359 U.S. 27 (1959), it was claimed that sections 13(1) and (2), which compel the Commission
to investigate colorable allegations of a carrier's violations of the Act, apply to discontinuances under section 13a(l); that Congress exceeded its powers under the commerce
clause in assuming jurisdiction over partial discontinuances; and that failure to hold a
hearing in such circumstances would violate the fifth amendment by depriving the carrier's
patrons of property without due process. The court held that the juxtaposition of section
13a with sections 13(1) and (2) was fortuitous; and that since Congress could occupy the
entire field of interstate transportation, it had authority to divide its jurisdiction between
the states and the ICC as it deemed fit, or to withhold jurisdiction from both.
25 Prior Commission approval is required for branch line abandonments under sections
1(18) and (20) of the Act, and under the partial abandonment doctrine state law invariably
required similar approval. However, it has been held that once Congress has chosen
to exercise federal jurisdiction it is free to give the ICC such authority as it chooses,
or if Congress so wishes it may insulate an interstate carrier from the jurisdiction of all
regulatory bodies, state or federal. New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 331-32
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Commission full discretion regarding the necessity for investigations and
hearings in section 13a(1) interstate discontinuance cases, 26 and that
giving such discretion does not constitute a deprivation of property
cognizable by the fifth amendment.2 7 Indeed, the federal courts have
held themselves to be without jurisdiction to review ICC decisions
permitting, or terminating investigations of, 13a(l) discontinuances.
This has been based on the ground that the Commission's power not
to conduct any investigations at all necessarily implies the lesser power
28
at issue.
Intrastate Discontinuances
Withdrawals of portions of interstate carriers' services on lines
wholly located within a single state are covered by section 13a(2) of the
Act.2 9 Although the procedures specified in that section are more burdensome to carriers than the interstate discontinuance procedures
specified in section 13a(1), the former do permit a carrier to opt for
ICC jurisdiction if it fails to obtain state sanction for a proposed
change of service. 30 To trigger ICC jurisdiction, either the carrier must
have been prohibited from implementing its discontinuance by state
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory authority; or an appropriate
state authority presented with a request for such discontinuance must
(D.N.J. 1959). In this regard, if the Commission fails to order an investigation within
the thirty day period provided by the statute, it loses all jurisdiction over the matter.
Sludden v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 150, 154 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
26 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sharfsin, 240 F. Supp. 233 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
27 Unlike rate or tariff changes, partial discontinuances relate to the general federal
power to regulate commerce which overrides any individual rights in a railroad's operations. Under these circumstances the court believed that the only way to compel the ICC
to hold a hearing on a proposed discontinuance under section 13a(l) was by petitioning
for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, alleging
abuse of discretion. New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 334 (D.N.J. 1959).
28 New Hampshire v. Boston & M. Corp., 251 F. Supp. 421 (D.N.H. 1965); Minnesota
v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 107 (D. Minn. 1965). However, in at least two cases, three
judge courts have affirmed, per curiam and without opinion, ICC determinations not to
instigate investigations under 13a(l). Rhodes v. United States, Civ. A. No. 63-477 (M.D.
Pa. 1963); California v. United States, Civ. A. No. 38915 (N.D. Cal. 1961). Although these
affirmances may be interpreted as implicitly supporting the reviewability of this type of
ICC determination, they more likely stem from a failure to observe the procedural nicety
of dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Although the statute dearly demands
non-reviewability of decisions not to start or continue an investigation, once the process
culminates in an opinion and order the general presumption in favor of reviewability
becomes somewhat stronger.
29 72 Stat. 572 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1964); see note 14 supra.
30 Discontinuance of all remaining intrastate passenger service is subject to section
13a(2) procedures. Boston & M. Corp. Discontinuance, 324 I.C.C. 705, 706-07 (1965). Moreover, once the ICC acquires jurisdiction, it is not lost by subsequent state action even if
such action might render moot the 13a proceedings. Northern Pac. Ry. Discontinuance,
312 I.C.C. 150, 156 (1960).
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have failed to take final action on such request within 120 days of its
presentation. 31 There is no requirement that the carrier must exhaust
its state judicial remedies, and the decisions and findings of the state
authorities have no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.3 2 Once its
jurisdiction has been established, and it has held a full hearing in the
affected state, the ICC may sanction the discontinuance if it finds that
the present or future public convenience and necessity permit and that
continued operations on the existing basis will constitute an unjust
and undue burden on the interstate operations of the carrier or on
interstate commerce. Unlike decisions barring proposed interstate discontinuances, which are effective for only one year, ICC refusals to permit intrastate discontinuances under section 13a(2) are temporally
unlimited.33
High Hurdles and Low Hurdles
The three types of abandonment are thus subject to increasingly
difficult procedural requirements. Interstate discontinuances are the
most favored, since the carrier may initiate them without prior Commission approval (albeit subject to a Commission-ordered stay). Total
abandonments come next, since the carrier may petition the ICC directly. Intrastate discontinuances are the least favored, since they require prior nonaction or negative action by an appropriate state regulatory agency. 34 The discrepancies between interstate and intrastate
31 In one case the state unsuccessfully attempted to avoid ICC jurisdiction by alleging
that the state authority to which the carrier originally had submitted its request for
discontinuance did not have jurisdiction over the matter. Although the Commission
failed to explain its decision, the state authority apparently did not assert lack of jurisdiction at the time of the original petition, and perhaps this rendered the bona fides of
the argument somewhat suspect. See Boston & M. Corp. Discontinuance, 324 I.C.C. 705,
708 (1965).
32 North Carolina v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 675 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
33 The statute requires continued operation unless the Commission can be induced to
grant authority to discontinue. 72 Stat. 572 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(2) (1964). Apparently
there is no limit on the number of times the carrier may petition the Commission for
authority to discontinue, but must again go through state procedures as a prerequisite to
further access to the ICC.
34 Quite naturally, carriers attempt to bring themselves within section 13a(i) whenever
possible, rather than subject themselves to the more rigorous procedures of section 13a(2).
These efforts have met with mixed success. New Jersey v. New York S. & W.R.R., 372
U.S. 1 (1963), reversing 200 F. Supp. 860 (D.N.J. 1961) (line wholly within N.J. with
leased bus service to N.Y. deemed intrastate and subject to section 13a(2); Texas & P. Ry.
Discontinuance, 807 I.C.C. 259 (1959) (trains operating to Texas-Arkansas border with
part of train crossing border and terminal in both states deemed interstate discontinuance
subject to 13a(1)).
In addition to arguing for section 13a(2) jurisdiction, at least one state, in order to
assure hearings in proposed interstate discontinuance cases, has challenged the partial
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discontinuances resulted from an uneasy compromise between the
original Senate bill, which would have applied the more liberal requirements to all discontinuances, and the original House version,
which would have ceded complete jurisdiction over intrastate discon35
tinuances to the states.
With all discontinuances now subject to federal jurisdiction, separate procedures for interstate and intrastate discontinuances are difficult to justify. Possibly, exclusive state jurisdiction over interstate discontinuances might be deemed a greater burden to carriers than similar
jurisdiction limited to intrastate discontinuances, on the ground that
the former would subject carriers to two or more possibly conflicting
state authorities. But having established ICC jurisdiction over both
types of discontinuances, the legislation should have provided similar
procedural requirements. That a rail service to be discontinued crosses
a state boundary does not alter the service's importance to the residents
of the affected states. And where a proposed discontinuance involves
both interstate and intrastate services, and the two cannot be economically disentangled, the necessity for separate procedures unduly complicates the Commission's efforts to view the issues in proper perspective,
particularly in view of the short time limitations imposed by section
13a(l). 36 In the New Haven Railroad case this difficulty apparently induced the Commission to ignore the statute and to include proposed
37
intrastate discontinuances in a 1a(1) proceeding.
Moreover, both the interstate and intrastate procedures specified by
the Act have dubious aspects. Requiring consideration of intrastate
discontinuances by state authorities as well as the ICC serves only to
abandonment doctrine originally created for its benefit by attempting to establish ICC
jurisdiction under section 1(18) rather than section 1a(1). Minnesota v. United States, 238
F. Supp. 107 (D. Minn. 1965).
35 S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1958). H.R. RP. No. 1922, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 47-48 (1958). The entire Transportation Act is characterized by largely unsatisfactory compromises between the more carrier and federal minded Senate and the more
commuter and state oriented House. The measure was passed on August 12, 1958, only
twelve days prior to adjournment of the 85th Congress, and changes in ICC jurisdiction over intrastate abandonments were made on the floor of Congress, 104 CONG. REC.
10862, 10864 (1958). As a result, the new legislation presents a crazy quilt of illogical distinctions, a host of new terms undefined and largely undefinable, and the absence of any
clear legislative history in certain aspects of the bill. Some measure of the resulting confusion may be seen in a recent Supreme Court case pertaining to a section 13a(2) discontinuance in which both the majority and the dissent cite the same legislative history to
support opposite conclusions. Southern Ry. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93, 101-03 (1964)
(majority); id. at 114-18 (dissent).
36 See Boston & M. Corp. Discontinuance, 324 I.C.C. 418, 424 (1965).
37 New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 327 I.C.C. 151, 199-201 (1966). Some commissioners found
fault with this procedure. Id. at 226, 229 (concurring opinion).
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delay final outcomes and to burden carriers with increased litigation
costs, especially since neither state decisions nor findings of fact bind
the ICC. At the same time, a system in which carriers can always
obtain a de novo ICC hearing after state authorities have failed to
grant a partial discontinuance may tempt state authorities to sidestep
their duty to grant justified but politically unpopular discontinuances.
The procedures applicable to interstate discontinuances subject the
Commission to unfair and unnecessary pressure. After the filing of the
required notices by the carrier, the Commission has only four months
to investigate the matter and make a decision.38 In the case of extensive
and highly complex discontinuances, such as those proposed by the
New Haven and the Boston & Maine railroads, the Commission has
been forced to shortcut its usual procedures and has complained of the
lack of time for an adequate analysis, decision, and opinion.3 9 Also with
respect to interstate discontinuances, the Commission may only order
a stay for a maximum of one year, after which time the carrier may
renew its petition. In order to extend a stay, the Commission must
embark upon another investigation and make new findings. 40
Finally, no sound basis exists for providing different procedures for
total abandonments and discontinuances. The two forms of service
withdrawal are virtually indistinguishable in terms of their respective
impacts upon the existing consumers of the services to be withdrawn.
If a carrier discontinues either freight or passenger service without
discontinuing the other, this is considered a partial discontinuance. 41
If a carrier discontinues either freight or passenger service after having
previously discontinued the other, however, this is considered a total
abandonment. 42 Clearly, the effect on the customers losing the discontinued service is the same in both cases. By the same token, although
discontinuances of both passenger and freight services certainly have
greater financial effects on the carrier and affect greater numbers of
persons than do discontinuances of just one service, the users of freight
and passenger services rarely are the same persons. In other words, the
loss of freight as well as passenger service generally will not complicate
the commuter's problems, and vice versa.
38 72 Stat. 571 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1964); see note 15 supra.
39 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 527 I.C.C. 151, 153 (1966); Boston & M.
Corp. Discontinuance, 324 I.C.C. 418, 419, 421 (1965).
40 72 Stat. 571 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1964).
41 Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939); Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 98, 104 (D.N.J. 1957); Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Abandonment, 271 I.C.C.
63 (1948); Morris & E.R.R. Proposed Abandonment, 175 I.C.C. 49 (1931); Public Convenience Application of Kansas City So. Ry., 94 I.C.C. 691 (1925).
42 United States Feldspar Corp. v. United States, 38 F.2d 91 (N.D.N.Y. 1930); New York
Cent. R.R. Abandonment, 254 I.C.C. 745 (1944).
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SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS

The ICC's newly acquired jurisdiction over discontinuances must be
exercised in accordance with the substantive standards set forth in section 13a of the Act.4 3 Somewhat surprisingly, the standards applicable
to interstate and intrastate discontinuances differ, at least in form, both
from each other and from the standard applicable to total abandonments set forth in section 1(18) of the Act. But the draftsmanship of
this portion of the Transportation Act leaves much to be desired, and
the intended direction and degree of divergence are left most unclear.
Unfortunately, neither the Commission nor the courts have provided
much explicit clarification.
Substantive Standards Imposed by Section 13a
Section 13a(l) of the Transportation Act provides that when the
ICC exercises its discretion to order an investigation of a proposed interstate discontinuance, it may order the continuance or restoration of
all or a part of the service or operation concerned for up to one year
upon findings that such service is required by public convenience and
necessity, and that its provision will not unduly burden interstate
commerce. By contrast, section 13a(2) provides that the ICC may grant
intrastate discontinuances only after full hearings and upon findings
that the present or future public convenience and necessity permit of
such discontinuance or change, and that continued operation or service
on the existing basis will constitute an unjust and undue burden upon
the interstate operations of the carrier or upon interstate commerce.
The Formal Structure of Section 13a
The formal structure of the substantive portions of section 13a exhibits certain interesting features. Whereas section 1(18) posits a single
criterion-public convenience and necessity-section 13a seems to posit
three or perhaps four separate criteria: public convenience and necessity, undue burden on interstate commerce, unjust burden on interstate
commerce, and perhaps burden on interstate operations. Furthermore,
with respect to interstate discontinuances the statute apparently places
the burden of making the findings necessary to stop the carrier on the
Commission, while with respect to intrastate discontinuances the carrier apparently must induce the Commission to find certain things in
order to permit the discontinuance. Finally, interstate discontinuances
may be prevented only if the Commission makes two findings-that the
service is required by public convenience and necessity and that con43 See note 14 supra.
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tinued service will not unduly burden the carrier's interstate operations
or interstate commerce-while intrastate discontinuances may be prevented if the Commission finds either of these two things.
On its face, section 13a might reasonably be interpreted as establishing undue and unjust burden upon a carrier's interstate operations or
upon interstate commerce as something separate and distinct from
public convenience and necessity. Under such a division and in accordance with generally accepted terminology, public convenience and
necessity would refer to the public need for the service; while undue
burden would refer to the impact on the carrier's finances, and ultimately on the rail system, of the losses attributable to the particular
service at issue. 4 But, as will appear, such an interpretation would both
represent a sharp departure from previous abandonment law, and
have very far reaching consequences for the future of passenger rail
service. Therefore, an intensive effort to find the proper interpretation
of this language is warranted. Such an effort should include close examination of the wording of the statute itself, of other relevant legislation,
of the intent underlying the development of the language through its
passage into law, of the consequences of alternate interpretations, and
of the decisions of the Commission and the courts.
Standards Applicable to Discontinuances Prior to the
TransportationAct
As previously stated, prior to the Transportation Act the field of
abandonment was divided between the ICC and the states, with the
former exercising jurisdiction over total abandonments, and the latter
exercising jurisdiction over discontinuances under the umbrella of the
partial abandonment doctrine.4 5 Abandonments of branch lines, however, were deemed total abandonments for purposes of ICC jurisdiction; 46 and since the effects of abandonments of branch lines on both
consumers and carriers are identical to those of discontinuances, the
interpretation of public convenience and necessity in cases of branch
line abandonments is relevant here.
The statutory standard for branch line abandonments was and is
that no carrier may abandon all or any part of a railroa't line without
first obtaining a certification from the ICC that the present or future
public convenience and necessity permit the abandonme1t.47 Broadly
44

See Southern Ry. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93 (1964); III-A

STATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 331-48 (1935).
45
46
47

See text at notes 16-17 supra.
See note 18 supra.. 41 Stat. 477, 478 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1(18), (20) (1964).
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speaking, this language has been interpreted as requiring the Commission to balance the damage to the railroad which might result from
continuance of the service in question against the hardship and incon48
venience to interested parties which might result from abandonment.
Railroad workers likely to lose their jobs if abandonments is permitted
have been included among the groups whose interests are to be protected. 49 The Commission has consistently refused, however, to assign
predetermined weights to each factor that must be considered, and the
cases do not easily yield general rules. For example, although a carrier
earning little or no net profits was denied permission to abandon a
highly unprofitable branch," ° a highly profitable carrier was permitted
to abandon a branch sustaining but negligible losses.8 '
Under the partial abandonment doctrine, the states were free to
impose any standards they chose within the limits of the due process
clause. Here the courts have generally interpreted due process to mean
that although carriers (and certain other businesses deemed charged
with particular public interest) cannot unilaterally withdraw a portion
of their services from the public, 5 2 neither can public authorities com-

pel carriers to continue operations despite continuing net losses in their
entire enterprise.8 3 Accordingly, the rule has been that a railroad may
be required to continue losing operations in a portion of its system so
long as its entire system shows profits, or at least operates without a
lOSS.5 4
48 I

SHARFMAN,

THE

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

177-82, 239-41, 282-92 (1931);

111-A SHARFMiAN, supra, at 340 (1935).
49 The Act requires the ICC to condition its approval of any transaction involving a
carrier subject to the Act on provision of fair and equitable arrangements to insure that
for a period of four years after the effective date of the order the railroad employees will
be in no worse position than they were prior to the transaction. 54 Stat. 906-07 (1949), 49
U.S.C. § 5(2)f (1964). At first, the ICC interpreted this language as applicable only to consolidations, but the Supreme Court deemed it applicable to abandonments as well. ICC
v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942). However, protection only must be
given in branch line abandonments, since the statute does not apply to total abandonments.
Texas Elec. Ry. Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 700 (1948); Susquehanna & N.Y.R.R. Abandonment, 252 I.C.C. 81 (1942).
80 Abandonment of Branches by Boston & M.R.R., 105 I.C.C. 13 (1925).
51 New York Cent. R.R. Abandonment, 282 I.C.C. 283 (1952).
82 Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923); Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
53 Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
54 Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79 (1924); Chas. Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 543 (1923); Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U.S. 513 (1921); Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 228 F. Supp.
690, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
However, this rule has been challenged by some courts. United States Feldspar Corp.
v. United States, 38 F.2d 91 (N.D.N.Y. 1930); Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Van Santwood,

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:301

Purpose of the TransportationAct
Legislative history clearly establishes that the Transportation Act
stemmed from considerable congressional apprehension regarding the
effect of mounting passenger deficits on the solvency of the national
rail system, and that the new legislation was intended to facilitate discontinuance of money-losing passenger services. 55 Indeed, the original
Senate bill would have permitted discontinuances solely upon proof
that the service could not be provided without a loss. This feature,
along with others, fell victim to a complex series of changes resulting
from compromises between carrier and passenger interests. 5 But concern with the harmful effects of continued passenger deficits was generally shared.5 7
Discontinuances and Rate Discrimination
A further clue to the statute's intent may be derived from noting
that the new provisions are located after section 13(4), rather than after
216 Fed. 252 (N.D.N.Y. 1914), 232 Fed. 978 (N.D.N.Y. 1916); Great No. Ry. v. Nagle,
16 F. Supp. 532 (D. Mont. 1936). Isolated cases have conditioned the obligation of a
carrier to continue money-losing services upon a demonstration that this would be a
"reasonable" requirement in light of the purposes of the regulation. Public Serv. Comm'n
v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 323 U.S. 675 (1944); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 46 F. Supp. 340 (D. Mont. 1942). In this regard, a three-judge
court in the Fifth Circuit has ruled that requiring a carrier to furnish services of facilities
no longer reasonably necessary to serve the public is tantamount to taking its property
without due process. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n, 96 F.
Supp. 583 (N.D. Fla. 1951). See also Southern Ry. v. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 91 F.
Supp. 980 (M.D. Ala. 1950); Ann Arbor R.R. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 91 F. Supp.
668 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 77 F. Supp. 675,
684 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
55 Congressional concern with the problem of surface transportation dates back to 1956.
See Hearings of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Communications of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956). The overall
passenger deficit for the nation's railroads was estimated to be running at $700 million
annually in 1958. S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
56 Under the bill first passed by the Senate both interstate and intrastate discontinuances
would have been denied if the Commission had found that "the operation or service of
such train [is) required by public convenience and necessity and that such operation or
service will not result in a net loss therefrom to the carrier or carriers and will not
otherwise unduly burden interstate or foreign commerce .
" S.
5. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1958). Thereafter the Senate bill was amended on the floor to limit ICC
jurisdiction to interstate discontinuances. 104 CONG. REc. 10862, 10864 (1958). This would
have brought the Senate bill into conformity in this regard with the bill passed by the
House. H.R. 12832, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1958). The final bill reinstated the ICC's
authority over intrastate abandonments but deleted the language that would permit discontinuances solely on the basis of a net loss to the carrier in providing a given service.
57 S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958).
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section 1(18), the portion of the Act dealing with total abandonments.
Broadly speaking, section 13(4) is concerned with state imposed intrastate freight and passenger rates that discriminate against interstate
commerce by failing to cover an appropriate measure of the cost of the
intrastate service. 5 Previously, such rates could be challenged by the
Commission only if they were found to constitute "undue, unreasonable or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce."59 To ease
the burden of carriers seeking intrastate rate increases under these circumstances, section 13(4) was amended by the Transportation Act to
empower the Commission to adjust intrastate rates if they were found
to constitute an "undue burden on interstate commerce." 60 According
to the legislative history, the addition of the same concept of "undue
burden" to section 13a was intended to achieve with respect to discontinuances an effect similar to that contemplated by section 13(4)
with respect to intrastate rates; namely, to ensure that the ICC would
be able to give due emphasis to the impact of money-losing operations
on the national transportation system. 61 Thus, it can be argued that,
in the same way it can raise intrastate rates in order to remove burdens
from interstate commerce, the Commission can eliminate losing operations threatening a carrier's financial integrity to remove burdens on
interstate commerce.
The Most Obvious Interpretation of the Statute
Under the most obvious interpretation of the statute, different substantive requirements apply to each of the three different types of service
58 Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
59 41 Stat. 484 (1920).
60 72 Stat. 571 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13(4) (1964).
61 To this effect, the report of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated that the bill would give the ICC jurisdiction in the field of discontinuances
similar to that which it had over intrastate rates under section 13 of the Act so that it
might deal with those matters that impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.
S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1958). The provision regarding an "unjust
burden" on a carrier's operations or upon interstate commerce, though not part of the
bill reported out by the Senate Committee, undoubtedly was also inspired by similar
language in section 13 with respect to intrastate rates. See 71 Stat. 571 (1958), 49 U.S.C.
§ 13(4) (1964). But the legislative history does not provide a clear indication of the meaning of the term in the context of discontinuances.
The meaning, if any, of "unjust discrimination" was an issue in the first Supreme
Court case interpreting the substantive provisions of section 13a. See text at notes 73-81
infra. The Supreme Court has affirmed a lower court decision holding that the addition
of the terms "undue burden on interstate commerce" to section 13(4) of the Act added
nothing that was not already included in the terms "undue, unreasonable, or unjust
discrimination against interstate commerce." Utah Citizens Rate Ass'n v. United States,
365 U.S. 649, affirming 192 F. Supp. 12 (D. Utah 1961). To the extent analogies to section
13(4) apply to section 13a, this might be interpreted to mean that "unjust" burden
is identical to "undue" burden.
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withdrawals-interstate discontinuances, intrastate discontinuances,
and total abandonments. Before pursuing this point, however, we must
first mention a word about terminology. From the cases to date it seems
clear that "unjust burden" is synonymous with "undue burden," and
that "undue burden on a carrier's operations" is synonymous with
"undue burden on interstate commerce.1 62 Thus, only public convenience and necessity and undue burden on interstate commerce remain
as identifiably separate criteria. According to our previous analysis,
public convenience and necessity refers to the community requirement
for the particular service, and undue burden refers to the impact of the
losses engendered by the service on the carrier's solvency. With respect
to total abandonments under section 1(18) we may assume that public
convenience and necessity encompasses both these factors.
To illustrate the varying substantive standards applicable to each
type of abandonment, we may analyze the statutory requirements in
terms of their applicability to various combinations of factors. For
convenience, we shall abbreviate public convenience and necessity
as "P" and undue burden on interstate commerce as "U," and indicate the presence or absence of the particular factor by 1 or 0. Thus,
P 1U1 indicates the presence of both public convenience and undue
burden on interstate commerce. These factors can be combined in four
63
ways: PoU 0, P 1UO, PoU1 , P1 UI.

According to section 13a(l), a carrier must be permitted to discontinue an interstate service unless the Commission finds that the service
is required by public convenience and necessity, and that provision of
the service will not result in an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Or, to use our shorthand, a carrier must continue if the Commission
finds P 1U 0; it need not continue if the Commission finds any of the
other three possible combinations. Section 13a(2), on the other hand,
provides that a carrier may discontinue only if the Commission finds
that continued service is not required by public convenience and necessity, and that continued provision of the service would result in an
undue burden-that is, PoUi. Thus, a carrier must continue if the
Commission finds PoU 0 , PIUo, or PIU 1 . Finally, under the balancing
62 See Southern Ry. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93 (1964), and the discussion of "unjust
burden" in note 61 supra. The allegation that these concepts are identical is based simply
on the failure of the cases to recognize any distinctions between them. See also New York,
N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 327 I.C.C. 151 (1966); Boston & M. Corp. Discontinuance,
324 I.C.C. 705 (1965).
63 Apparently the fact that an interstate discontinuance will take effect unless the
Commission makes the findings specified by section 13a(l) does not shift the burden of
proof in such cases to the Commission. See Great No. Ry. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 59
(1959).
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test of section 1(18), which weighs public need against burden on the
carrier, a carrier must continue if the Commission finds P1UO; it may
abandon if the Commission finds PoU 1 ; and the outcome is uncertain
in the cases of PoU 0 and P 1U1 .
Thus, under this approach to the statute, an interstate discontinuance would always be permissible if an undue burden was demonstrated, no matter what the need; and an intrastate discontinuance
would never be permissible so long as any need was demonstrated, no
matter what the burden; and the success of a petition for total abandonment could not be readily predicted if the facts indicated either
great need and great burden, or low need and low burden. Assuming
that the number of combinations of P and U yielding abandonment is
an adequate measure of the ease of abandonment, we would find, as we
did with respect to procedural matters, that interstate discontinuance
would rank as the easiest, total abandonment as the next easiest, and
intrastate discontinuance as the most difficult.
Upon the basis of the language itself, of the position of section 13a
in the Act, of the general congressional purpose, and of the direction
of the compromises underlying the legislation, it may be effectively
argued that the foregoing represents the "best" interpretation of the
relevant statutes. But strict adherence to this interpretation would
probably not have yielded the incontrovertibly sensible result reached
in the New Haven Discontinuance case, described at the beginning of
this article; and it might well force undesirable consequences in such
future cases. Close examination of the decisions interpreting section 13a
may permit, however, a somewhat more subtle reading of the statute,
which may in turn provide a more workable scheme than seemed possible upon first blush.
Is there a Single Substantive Standard for Interstate Discontinuances,
Intrastate Discontinuances, and Total Abandonments?
From the cases it seems quite clear that, despite the undeniable difference in language between sections 13a(1) and (2), and despite the
legislative history indicating a congressional intention to make interstate discontinuances less arduous than intrastate discontinuances, both
the Commission and the courts treat all discontinuances alike. The refusal of the Commission to assume the burden of proof in interstate
discontinuance cases has already been noted.64 What has not already
been noted is that in every section 13a(1) interstate discontinuance
case in which the Commission has ordered an investigation but decided
64 See note 63 supra.
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not to block the discontinuance, as well as in every section 13a(2) intrastate discontinuance case, the Commission has made explicit findings that the service was not required by public convenience and necessity, and that continued operations would result in an undue burden
on interstate commerce. 65 As we have seen, these are exactly the findings required by the statute to support an intrastate discontinuance
under section 13a(2), but they are not the ones required to support an
interstate discontinuance under section 13a(1).
Moreover, the Commission in all cases decided under sections 13a(l)
and (2) finds either convenience and necessity plus no undue burden,
or lack of convenience and necessity plus an undue burden; 66 it never
finds public convenience and necessity plus an undue burden. Since
any difference in the standards for evaluating interstate and intrastate
discontinuances must rest on the possibility of permitting an interstate,
but not an intrastate, discontinuance in these latter circumstances, we
thus have further proof that both types of discontinuance are being
subjected to the same standards.
Further indirect evidence of the Commission's determination to
treat all discontinuances under a single set of substantive standards is
found in the New Haven Discontinuance case, where the Commission,
after including intrastate discontinuances within a I3a(l) proceeding,
subjected them to the same standards that it applied to the interstate
discontinuances clearly before it.67 Finally, it is interesting to note that
the only official discussion of the possible differences between the two
types of discontinuance is found in a footnote to a Supreme Court decision in an intrastate discontinuance case. There the Court cites some
highly equivocal legislative history as establishing the identity of the
standards for the two types of discontinuance. 6
Just as they appear to treat interstate and intrastate discontinuances
alike, the cases exhibit a strong tendency to ignore the very extensive
differences in language, approach, and legislative history, and to subject
discontinuances and abandonments of branch lines to identical substantive standards. 69 Indirect but compelling proof of this is to be found
65 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 327 I.C.C. 151, 255 (1966); Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry. Discontinuance, 312 I.C.C. 79 (1960); Chicago 9. NW. Ry. Discontinuance,
307 I.C.C. 463 (1959); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 79 (1959);
Great No. Ry. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 59 (1959).
66 St. Louis S.W. Ry. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 639 (1959); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 477 (1959); Southern Pac. Partial Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 209
(1959); Louisville & N.R.R. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 173 (1959).
17 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 327 I.C.C. 151, 201, 206, 229 (1966).
68 Southern Ry. v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 93, 103 n.16 (1964). The dissent persuasively draws the opposite conclusion-i.e., that Congress intended separate standards
for interstate and intrastate discontinuances. Id. at 114-19.
6D One exception may be found in the treatment of labor. The ICC has held that
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in the degree to which section 13a cases are cited, without qualification
or identification as such, as precedents for section 1(18) total abandonment cases, and vice versa. In fact, Southern Railway v. North Carolina,
an intrastate discontinuance case and the only Supreme Court case interpreting the substantive provisions of 13a, is cited as the controlling
70
authority for every type of abandonment or discontinuance.
The Southern Railway Case
As we have demonstrated with respect to procedural aspects, a single
standard should apply to all types of service withdrawals. But it remains
to determine the content of this standard. This task will require a close
examination of the two most important decisions in this area: Southern
Ry. v. North Carolina7' and New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Discontinu72

ance.

The Southern Railway, after unsuccessfully requesting permission
from the North Carolina Utility Commission to discontinue the last
two passenger trains between Greensboro and Goldsboro, North Carolina, invoked ICC jurisdiction under section 13a(2).73 The ICC found
while the effect on labor is a factor to be considered in granting a discontinuance, the
Commission cannot issue an order making the discontinuance conditional on the carrier's
providing financial protection for employees. Great No. Ry. Discontinuance, 807 I.C.C. 59
(1959); compare the ICC's power to issue a conditional order under section 1(18), discussed
in note 49 supra. The Commission's position is based on the fear that disparate results
would otherwise occur, since states granting discontinuances might not give employees
similar protection. On the basis of similar reasoning, the ICC has ruled that since it cannot
impose conditions for the protection of labor on an interstate discontinuance under
section 13a(l), neither can it impose such conditions with respect to an intrastate discontinuance.
Apparently, the prohibition on imposing conditions extends to all types of restrictions
that might be imposed on a carrier as a condition for granting a discontinuance under
section 13a. See Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.R.R. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 125 (1959)
(section 13a(1)); Missouri Pac. R.R. Discontinuance, 14 Fed. Carr. Cas. 40, 184 (1960)
(section 13a(2)).
Although the Commission's interpretation of section 13a seems sound enough, there appears to be little justification for treating workers harmed by a discontinuance differently
from those harmed by a total abandonment. The value to labor of being considered as
part of the total picture affecting the final outcome of a discontinuance seems quite limited, and it is difficult to find a case where it has had any impact at all. Moreover, if a discontinuance were otherwise justified, it seems odd to force a carrier to continue operations
just to protect jobs when by making appropriate financial provisions for the affected
workers, all interests could be satisfied.
70 Tri-B Corp., Shelby, Iowa v. ICC, 253 F. Supp. 715, 718 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Humphreys
v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 910, 913 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 228 F. Supp. 690, 696 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. Discontinuance,
328 I.C.C. 278, 294-96 (1966).
71 376 U.S. 93 (1964).
72 327 I.C.C. 151 (1966).
73 The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the Utility Commission's decision in
State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 254 N.C. 73, 118 S.E.2d 21 (1961).
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that the costs of providing these services were three times the revenues
derived from them; that the railroad would save $90,589 per annum
by discontinuing the services; that the need for the services was insubstantial despite a fairly high population density in the area; that existing rail, bus, and airline services between the two cities were reasonably adequate; and that discontinuance would not seriously hamper
industrial growth in the area. 74 The Commission did not attempt to
determine either the profitability of freight traffic over the affected
lines, or the carrier's total earnings from traffic within North Carolina.
It stated that it had considered but had given little weight to the car75
rier's overall prosperity.
On the basis of these findings, the Commission determined that continued operation would constitute a wasteful service and would impose
an undue burden on interstate commerce; it therefore authorized the
carrier to discontinue.78 On appeal, a three judge district court found
that the Commission had erred in not considering the carrier's overall
earnings from both freight and passenger services on the segment of the
line in issue; accordingly, the court perpetually enjoined the carrier
from discontinuing the two passenger trains. 7 The Supreme Court,
74 Southern Ry. Discontinuance, 317 I.C.C. 255 (1962).

75 The Commission had similarly interpreted section 13a(2) in Southern Pac. Partial
Discontinuance, 312 I.C.C. 631 (1961), and in Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Discontinuance, 307 I.C.C. 668 (1960). In the former case, the Commission held that the purpose of
section 13a(2) was to permit the discontinuance of services that no longer pay their way
and for which there is no longer sufficient public need to justify financial loss. The Commission stated that nowhere in the Act was there an indication that the prosperity of a
carrier's interstate operations, or any segment thereof, is relevant to the determination of
whether a given intrastate train imposes an unjust and undue burden on interstate
commerce.
76 Southern Ry. Discontinuance, 317 I.C.C. 255, 260 (1962).
77 North Carolina v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 675 (M.D.N.C. 1962). The three judge
decision was based largely on the failure of Congress to authorize the ICC in proceedings
under section 13a to disregard the overall profits derived by a carrier from its operations
within the affected state. This, according to the court, implies that the Commission might
consider such intrastate operations as a significant factor in deciding intrastate discontinuance cases. The court pointed out that prior to the Transportation Act of 1958 the
Supreme Court, in two cases, had required the ICC to weigh the effect of allegedly discriminatory rates on a carrier's intrastate operations as well as on its overall operations.
Public Serv. Comm'n v. United States, 356 U.S. 421 (1958); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R.
v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300 (1958). It was only by means of an amendment to section 13(4)
of the Act that the Commission was authorized to ignore the strictly intrastate effects
of a given rate. 72 Stat. 570-71 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 13(4) (1964). Therefore, the court conduded, since the effect of discriminatory intrastate rates is identical to the effect of the
continued operation of money-losing intrastate service, in the absence of specific authority
in section 13a to the contrary, the Commission is bound by the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in the rate discrimination cases and must consider the overall return to the carrier
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with two Justices dissenting, reinstated the ICC authorization for
8
discontinuance3
According to the Court, the purpose of the Transportation Act was
to permit the discontinuance of services that no longer paid their way
and no longer met a public need sufficient to outweigh the heavy financial losses implicit in their continued operation$ 9 Furthermore, the Act
cannot be read as requiring the Commission to consider the prosperity
of all other segments of the carrier's intrastate operations as relevant to
the problem of determining whether operation of a given intrastate
train imposes an unjust and undue burden on interstate commerce.8 0
Generally, concluded the Court, the Commission should weigh the
degree of public inconvenience that might result from a discontinuance
against the carrier's ability to absorb continuing losses; but, if the
Commission finds little public need for the service, it may justifiably
give little weight to the size of the loss engendered by the disputed
operations as compared to the carrier's overall prosperity.8 '
of all its operations within the state. The majority deemed irrelevant the substance and
history of the rate discrimination legislation cited by the lower court. 376 U.S. at 98, 111.
78

Id. at 106.

70 Id. at 101. Here the Court quoted at length from the ICC opinion in Southern Pac.

R.R. Partial Discontinuance, 312 I.C.C. 631, 633-34 (1961). See note 75 supra.
80 The Court stated: "But neither the profitability of such freight operations as are fortuitously conducted on the same line as a given passenger service nor the profitability of
all operations within any given State bears any practical relationship either to the public's
need for the service in question or to the burden which the deficit imposes on interstate
commerce." 376 U.S. at 103 n.16. This argument would appear unanswerable with regard
to "undue" burdens on interstate commerce. However, it does not directly deal with "unjust" burdens which apparently are assumed to add little or nothing to "undue" burdens.
81 The Court also rejected the argument that the Commission's decision ignored the
legislative history of the Act and, in effect, read the phrase "unjust burden" out of section
13a(2). The statute, according to the dissent, conditions the granting of an intrastate discontinuance upon a demonstration that public convenience and necessity permit the discontinuance and that continued operation would constitute an undue and unjust burden
on interstate commerce. Presumably, the "justness" and "dueness" of the burden on interstate commerce and on the carrier that might result from continued operations cannot
be determined without an examination of both the carrier's earnings on the affected
lines and its overall prosperity. Unless these factors are considered, every loss could be
deemed undue and unjust. Such a standard, they argued, was explicitly rejected by Congress
when it substituted the present language for that of the original Senate bill, which would
have permitted both interstate and intrastate discontinuances solely on proof of a net
loss in providing a given service. See note 56 supra. The dissent interpreted this history
as proving that the net loss standard must not be applied, at least in intrastate discontinuances. 376 U.S. at 114-18.
It is difficult to take serious issue with that portion of the Southern Railway decision
which found that the propriety of an intrastate discontinuance is totally unrelated to the
profits the carrier earns over the line affected by the discontinuance, or within the state
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The New Haven Case
The New Haven case involved an interstate discontinuance under
section 13a(1), although, as previously noted, the Commission included
certain intrastate services within its decision and order.82 The railroad
argued that discontinuance of all its passenger services was necessary
for the protection of its freight services; and that according to the
national transportation policy, the legislative history of section 13a,
and prior Commission decisions, the protection of freight services
should be carriers' and the Commission's first concern. The latter argument was supported with the Boston &' Maine Corp. Discontinuance
cases, in which the Commission had accepted the proposition that the
instant carrier's passenger services should be sacrificed to save its freight
83
services.
At the beginning of its discussion and conclusions, the Commission
quoted the statutory language to show that in an interstate discontinuance case "continuance of all or part of the involved service may
in which the line is located. A railroad may earn large profits from its freight traffic over
a given line. It also may earn a total profit from all operations within a state. But neither
of these facts is relevant to the need for the service or to the effect on the carrier's financial stability or on interstate commerce of continuing it. The need for the service must
be determined by analyzing the effects of withdrawing it, and the financial effect on the
carrier of continuing the service can only be determined by examining its operations
throughout its entire system. The weak point, if any, of the decision is its failure explicitly to expound the significance of "unjust burden," leaving the impression, as asserted
by the dissent, that "u'njust burden" has been equated with "undue burden." For a discussion of "undue burden" in an analogous context see Colorado v. United States, 271
U.S. 153 (1926); Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & 0. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
However, in the absence of any legislative guidance regarding the significance of an
"unjust burden" as compared to an "undue burden," the Court cannot be criticized for
refusing to add blindly an additional concept to abandonment law. Moreover, a recent case
has held that with respect to rate discriminations under section 13(4) of the Act, "undue
burden" is synonymous with "unjust burden." Utah Citizens Rate Ass'n v. United States,
192 F. Supp. 12 (D. Utah), af'd, 365 U.S. 649 (1961). See also note 61 supra.
82 See text at note 87 supra.
83 324 I.C.C. 705, 723-25 (1965); 324 I.C.C. 418, 452-55 (1965). The two cases involved
attempts by the Boston and Maine to discontinue its interstate and intrastate passenger
service, respectively. The Commission, with a fascinating reverse twist, inserted this notion
of balancing freight vs. passenger services into its consideration of public convenience and
necessity. That is, rather than limiting the concept of public convenience and necessity to the
needs of the patrons of the service to be discontinued, the Commission also considered the
advantages that would flow from preserving the railroad whose existence was threatened
by the continuance of that service. In the first cited case the Commission stated: "The
elimination of that burden is required in the public interest, in order that the railroad itself might be preserved to provide essential services over the wide area of New
England for the hundreds of communities therein which are greatly dependent upon it
for their economic well-being and general welfare.
"The public convenience and necessity most assuredly permits, even requires, the discontinuance of the trains here in issue." 324 I.C.C. at 723.
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be required, for as much as a full year, only (emphasis in original) if
the Commission finds: 'that the operation of such train or ferry is required by public convenience and necessity and will not unduly burden interstate or foreign commerce....'"84 Next the Commission
stated that there were two tests to be applied-public convenience and
necessity and undue burden-and proceeded to discuss the former
solely in terms of patronage and the latter in terms of the financial
burden on the carrier of providing the services. 85 In this regard, the
Commission found that many of the services involved were essential
not only to the communities directly involved, but also many other communities within and beyond Southern New England; that the carrier
was in terrible financial shape (it was under trusteeship); and that the
carrier's passenger services contributed heavily, though not exclusively,
to its financial difficulties.8 6
The Commission rebuffed, however, the carrier's attempt to deal
with all passenger services as a single unit, and found "no justification"
for the discontinuance of all the passenger services to save the freight
services.81 In doing so, the Commission ruled that it was free to determine whether a carrier's freight or passenger services should be deemed
of paramount importance.88 The Boston & Maine situation was distinguished on the grounds that there the carrier was primarily a freight
carrier, whereas the New Haven's passenger services were as, if not
more, important than its freight services.8 9 The concept of passenger
or freight predominance does not fit easily within the statutory confines of sections 13a and 1(18), but the Commission made no effort to
clarify this point in either decision.
The Commission also seemed to hint at an alternative argument;
namely, that the New Haven's freight services were also losing money,
and eliminating the passenger services would not by itself put the railroad in the black. 0 The significance of this argument is somewhat
obscure if we accept the thesis that it is the freight services that must
be saved, since in that case any action that reduces the overall deficit
contributes to the desired end. The propriety and utility of a regulatory scheme that forces the Commission to make excruciating choices
between freight and passenger services in situations in which both are
84

85
86
87
88
89

327 I.C.C. at 202.
at 202-16.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 203-04.
Id.

90 Id. at 203.
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essential is one of the main concerns of this article, and it will be discussed in detail shortly. 91
Having refused to treat the passenger services as a unit, the Commission ordered the New Haven to continue all of its commuter services and some of its through services. 9 2 According to the Commission,
the intent of the statute was that carriers should be required to continue those train services which "are essential to meet the demonstrated
needs of the public and which appear to have sufficient potential for
being economically viable." 93 Apparently, these included all existing
commuter services. The Commission made no specific findings as to the
burdens imposed by continuing individual trains and runs, although
at various points it indicated disagreement with the railroad's estimates
on these matters. 94
Without impugning the excellent motives of the Commission, and
without underestimating the tremendous handicaps imposed upon it
by the vagueness of the statute and the weakness of the entire regulatory scheme, it may be said that the Commission quite clearly did not
believe its own findings and was in fact granting temporary relief by
improvising on the statute. The order to continue service was made
effective only for eight months, rather than for the statutory maximum
of twelve months. This was done, according to the Commission, both
to give the New Haven the opportunity and flexibility to work toward
establishing an operating framework of "essential" passenger service,
a goal that the instant proceeding seemingly could not achieve, and to
freeze matters until the outcome of the proposed Pennsylvania and
New York Central merger was determined, since purchase of the New
Haven had been made a condition of the Commission's approval of the
merger. 95 Moreover, the railroad was to be given time to try to improve
its efficiency and to make its passenger services more attractive and profitable, and the affected communities were to be given time to offer various types of assistance to the railroad. This implied that many of the
services involved did indeed meet the requirements for discontinuance;
but that the issues were so important and complicated that, rather than
for the Commission to issue a final order, the interested parties should
be given more time to work out their own solution. Unquestionably,
this was the best solution to the New Haven problem. But section 13a
makes no provision for such an interlocutory order; in fact, the entire
91 See discussion at notes 103-04 infra.
92

327 I.C.C. at 205-18.

93 Id. at 205.
94 Id. at 188-99, 203, 206.

95 Id. at 216-18.
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thrust of the statute is to facilitate interstate discontinuances by severely
limiting the Commission's power to delay such actions. 9 In any case,
we shall return to this interesting procedural innovation at a later point.
How Abandonment Decisions Are Made
Even the most careful reading of court and Commission decisions in
discontinuance and total abandonment cases does not yield a particularly clear picture of the decision-making process applied in these cases.
And the contrast between the dual standards of public convenience
and necessity and undue burden on interstate commerce for discontinuances under section 13a, and the single standard of public convenience and necessity for total abandonments under section 1(18),
hardly makes for clarity. Some pattern may be discerned, however, if
we assume that in all cases the Commission weighs the relative impacts
on all interested parties of continuing or withdrawing the services at
issue, and that the seemingly divergent criteria provided by sections
1(18) and 13a are actually only different ways of denominating the same
range of interests and effects.
For total abandonments, the single concept of public convenience
and necessity must include all effects on all interested parties of
continuing or withdrawing the services at issue. We may conveniently
divide the interested parties into three groups: users of the services at
issue; users of the carrier's other (passenger or freight) services; and various outsiders, such as storekeepers in communities dependent upon factories that ship over affected lines, and citizens of nearby metropolises
that might suffer from increased strain on their street, parking, and
public transportation facilities if rail passengers were forced to commute by road. Withdrawing existing services affects the first group and
some members of the third; continuing those services affects the second
group and some of the members of the third, the latter not necessarily
being different from those who are affected by withdrawing the services.
The impact of withdrawing existing services is straightforward enough.
The impact of continuing those services is somewhat more complicated:
continuation at a loss may force users of the carrier's other services to
pay what amounts to a subsidy; and may, insofar as it reduces the viability of the carrier, threaten both the other services' users and the miscellaneous parties with a total collapse of all services.
For discontinuances under section 13a, the two concepts of public
06 For interstate discontinuances, the Commission must order an investigation within
thirty days or permanently lose all jurisdiction over the matter. Sludden v. United States,
211 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1962). Thereafter the Commission has but four months to make
its investigation and render a decision. See note 16 supra.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 34:301

convenience and necessity and undue burden on interstate commerce
together encompass the same territory as does public convenience and
necessity simpliciter under section 1(18). Indeed, as interpreted by
the Commission, the two concepts of section 13a epitomize the classic
duality of section 1(18) public convenience and necessity: public convenience refers to the effect of withdrawing the services at issue on their
users and on other interested parties, and undue burden refers to the
effect of continuing the services on all interested parties, including the
services' users. But it should be noted that determining undue burden
under section 13a is a multiple-step process. First, the effect of continuance of deficit-producing service is translated into its impact upon the
carrier's ability to provide its other services at the going prices or,
more likely, at any prices at all. Then, the effect of withdrawal of those
other services is evaluated. Finally, the likelihood and effect of withdrawal of the other services are balanced against the direct effect of
97
withdrawal of only the specific services at issue.
After establishing all the factors relevant to each of the section 13a
concepts, the Commission proceeds to weigh one set against the other.
It does not reach conclusions with regard to each concept separately
and then make a final decision. Rather, it looks to the magnitude of the
impact on each interested group, and then to the relative importance
of those groups. As we have seen, however, carriers are never required
to continue deficit-producing services unless some substantial need for
them is demonstrated (that is, unless there is a P1 U1 or P1 UO situation).
Finally, the effect of a given loss on an ultimate decision will vary in
accordance with both the overall financial strength of the carrier and
98
the importance of the services at issue.
97 It appears that in the Boston & Maine case, the Commission departed from its usual
practice by considering the ultimate consequences of continued operations in its treatment of public convenience and necessity in a section 13a discontinuance. Boston &
Maine Corp. Discontinuance, 324 I.C.C. 705, 723 (1965). Thus, the Commission stated
that public convenience and necessity required the abandonment in order to preserve
other, more important services of the carrier. Although this treatment can be defended
if used consistently, it is out of step with the usual formulations in which such considerations are deemed relevant to undue burdens on interstate commerce; public convenience and necessity serves better if limited to the immediate impact of withdrawing a
given service.
98 Thus the fate of a service of intermediate importance will depend in part upon the
size of the loss compared to the ability of the carrier to bear it. As the importance of the
service increases, the Commission will impose a larger relative loss on the carrier. Often
there is a point at which a choice must be made between all passenger and all freight
services. In the Boston & Maine case the Commission decided that despite the possible
serious consequences on the users and the surrounding community of withdrawing all passenger service, the carrier's freight services were more important to the area and could be
preserved only by sacrificing the passenger service. By contrast, in New Haven, the Coin-
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Duties of the Carriersand the Communities
Before we leave the cases, we should examine a heretofore unmentioned aspect of the Commission's decision in the New Haven case.
Two particularly vexing aspects of passenger service problems are the
level of effort carriers should make to attract profitable passenger business, and the degree to which the interested communities should assist
carriers in preserving given services. Prior to New Haven, the Commission had declared that it would not find burdens on interstate commerce to be "undue" within the meaning of section 13a if the carrier
had deliberately disregarded its services in order to prepare a case for
discontinuance. 99 In New Haven it ruled that a carrier must:
accord the promotion of its economically viable passenger
service the same reasonable effort it would accord to promotion of its basic freight services, as for example, when the
latter were threatened by competitive forces. This reasonable
effort should be manifested by service improvements, longrange market analysis, rate reformation, capital investment
in research and technological achievements applicable to passenger operations, and sound analysis of the real costs of
providing passenger services with a rail plant used also for
the provision of freight services. But it need not be sustained
beyond that point at which the carrier can demonstrate an
unwillingness on the part of the public either to sustain the
services through patronage or by assuming a fair share of the
cost of maintaining such services. 10 0
The Commission continued, however, by declaring that the public
must match the "reasonable effort" of the railroads by providing an
appropriate level of support for these services:
[This] should not be interpreted as requiring a willingness by
the public to "pay the bill" as tendered by the carrier or carriers providing such services at a deficit. Yet, it must imply
something more than a mere willingness to provide only that
financial assistance which is necessary to sustain such services,
and possibly the financial condition of the carrier offering
them, at a point just short of collapse.... The reasonable level
mission deemed the passenger service such an important component of the carrier's functions that it refused to sacrifice it for the benefit of the freight service, and it was willing
to accept greater damage to the carriers finances, at least in the short run. See text at notes
65 and 73-83, supra. See also Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Discontinuance, 328 I.C.C.
278, 294-96 (1966), for a particularly lucid exposition of this process.
99 Southern Pac. Co. Discontinuance, F.D. 23800 (Jan. 24, 1966).
100 327 I.C.C. at 221 (emphasis in original).
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of public support should in fact be construed as that level of
financial or other public assistance which will stimulate the
carrier to initiate or, if already initiated, continue its own
reasonable effort to sustain and improve essential and economically viable passenger services.10 1
According to the Commission, programs of public support should not
be limited to financial help, but should include joint government10 2 But
carrier efforts to determine future demands and requirements.
to
the Commission declared itself unavailable to serve as an arbitrator
03
negotiations.
during
arising
differences"
"insoluble
resolve
These efforts at providing guidelines for carrier and public conduct
regarding passenger service both represent a very interesting new
departure for the Commission, and provide material for speculation
and analysis. The need for, and the possible success of, this kind of
approach will be discussed shortly in connection with proposals for
alternate regulatory arrangements. It may be noted here, however,
that the Commission's reference to the level of carrier and public support for "economically viable" services is puzzling: if subsidies are
needed, the services are by definition not "economically viable." Perhaps the standard is economic viability without more subsidies than
public authorities can reasonably be expected to provide, but the usefulness of this conceptualization is debatable.
IV.

THE ADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING REGULATORY SYSTEM;
SOME LIKELY ALTERNATIVES

Undoubtedly, regulation of discontinuances by the ICC within the
substantive framework of public conveniences and necessity is preferable to exclusive state jurisdiction over discontinuances, or to regulation by the Commission in accordance with standards markedly different from those applied to total abandonments. But even granting this,
the existing regulatory system is inequitable and ineffective; and it fails
miserably when confronted with proposed discontinuances of important passenger services rendered by financially weak carriers such
as the New Haven, the Boston & Maine, and even the New York
Central. Why should the Commission be faced with the necessity of
choosing between passenger and freight services when both are often
so vital to so many people?
The problem can be traced back to the absence of a national trans101 Id. at 222-23 (emphasis in original).
102 Ibid.
103 Id. at 219.
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portation plan, and to the inadequacy of the remedies currently available to the ICC. The solution lies in the formulation of a national
transportation plan, and in a restructuring of the roles of the various
agencies and political entities that deal with transportation matters.
Hopefully, the newly created Department of Transportation will initiate the steps necessary to the former. 10 4 But, whatever the possibilities
of an overall structuring of our transportation needs and priorities may
be, significant changes in the existing railroad regulatory system are
essential to any satisfactory solution of our transportation problems. 10 5
Therefore, the remainder of this article examines the structural weaknesses of the existing system, and presents some suggestions for reform.
Deficiencies of the ICC's Existing Remedies
Under circumstances in which the costs of given services cannot be
recovered from the users thereof, current law affords the ICC two
alternatives-continuance or abandonment. If abandonment is ordered, the impact will be borne by the former users of the services
and by other groups affected either by the deprivation of the services
or by the resulting switch to other forms of transportation. If continuance is ordered, the impact may be borne by one or more of several
groups, none of whom have much interest in the preservation of the
services. The railroad itself may assume the resulting losses, in which
case the burden will be shifted to the railroad's shareholders and possibly (if a total collapse of services threatens) to other groups. Or, if the
elasticity of demand and the ICC permit, the carrier may be able to
adjust its other rates sufficiently to cover the losses, in which case the
104 Unfortunately, the role of the Transportation Department in national planning
was limited to the establishment of criteria for federal investment in transportation. 80
Stat. 941 (1966) 49 U.S.C.A. § 1656 (Supp. 1966). However, the formulation of such standards must be based upon determinations of the requirements for each type of transportation facility in each part of the country. If thoroughly done, this could form a solid
basis for a true national transportation policy.
105 There have been numerous recommendations for improving the rail passenger service situation. See LocKaN, EcoNoamcs OF TRANSPORTATION (5th ed. 1960). The Commission also made its own investigation and reported its findings in Railroad Passenger
Train Deficit, 306 I.C.C. 417 (1959). Its recommendations included repeal of the federal
excise tax on fares; amendment of the federal tax laws to encourage increased state
and local tax relief consistent with the desire of these communities to retain commuter
services; the takeover, in effect, of certain commuter services by local political bodies which
would hire the carriers to operate them; and reconsideration by the Executive Branch of
practices by the Post Office and Defense Departments in light of national transportation
policy. Some action has been taken regarding local relief and operation of certain commuter services by the metropolitan communities served thereby. See note 110 infra. Of
course, this type of action is not the particular concern of this article, which is directed
towards structural problems.
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burden will be shifted to other passengers and shippers and ultimately
06
to the consumers of the products shipped.
Such results are at once inequitable and ineffective. A railroad's
ability to continue providing money-losing services is limited by either
its ability to pass the losses on to its other customers by charging higher
rates, or by its ability to absorb the losses itself by digging into profits
or assets. Similarly, fare increases can be accomplished only to the extent permitted by the appropriate regulatory agency and the elasticity of demand for the services concerned. 0 7 Thus, the ability of
the ICC to force subsidization of particular money-losing services is
limited by factors irrelevant to the importance of those services. Services of equal importance, for example, may be continued or withdrawn depending on whether the carrier involved is a strong, mainly
freight-carrying one such as the Sante Fe, or a weak, mainly passengercarrying one such as the New Haven. Such results unjustifiably discriminate among citizens served by different railroads located in different parts of the country.
Characteristicsof an Ideal System

What would be an ideal system? We have seen that the core of the
railroad problem is the fact that the overall value of railroad services
to the public often is greater than the amount users are willing to pay
for those services. We have also seen that putting the losses engendered
by money-losing services on carriers' shareholders and freight-service
users is both ineffective and inequitable. 0 8 Therefore, the situation
seems to require some means by which the public can help to support
rail services-or, to use a nasty phrase, subsidies financed by public
revenues.
There is little difficulty in establishing the general principle that
public subsidies of rail passenger services may often be appropriate;
indeed, this seems to be widely accepted. Nor is there much difficulty
in envisioning forms such subsidies might take; direct monetary payments, tax reductions, and low interest loans are among numerous
examples. Devising a scheme for allocating the burden of providing
subsidies presents, however, a real problem. A theoretical solution
is easy to devise: each political entity involved should contribute an
amount proportional to its interest in maintaining the services at issue.
106 S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1958). H.R. RIP. No. 1922, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8-11 (1958). FAINSOD, GORDON & PALAMOUNTAIN, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMtY 273-79, 283-85, 316 (3d ed. 1959).
107 FAINSOD, GORDON 9- PALAMOUNTAIN, op. cit. supra note 106, at 284-85, 310, 312.
108 See discussion and references cited in notes 56 & 81 supra.
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But just stating this solution reveals its difficulties. One is inevitably
reminded of the maneuvering, bargaining and name-calling that went
on during the effort to obtain financial support for the New Haven from
the various interested parties-the federal government; the states of
New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts; the cities
of New York, New Haven, Providence, and Boston, etc. 10 9
Subsidies Under the Existing System
Of course, even now there exist both federal and state programs of
railroad assistance.:" But the existing system provides no mechanism
for harnessing the expertise and independence of the ICC to the financial resources of the assistance-granting agencies. The only options
available to the ICC are to permit or to deny abandonment. Government bodies that might consider affording financial assistance in
certain potential withdrawal situations often either fail to recognize
a problem until withdrawal has become unavoidable, or; if they be100

See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 38, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Dec 7, 1965, p. 39, col. 3.
110 Federal assistance is available under chapters 19 and 21 of the Interstate Commerce
Act. 72 Stat. 568 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1231-40 (1964); 78 Stat. 302 (1964), 80 Stat. 715 (1966),
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-11 (Supp. 1966). Chapter 19 makes federal guarantees available for
loans to railroads for capital improvement or maintenance. Chapter 21 provides grants
and loans to state and local public bodies for financing the acquisition, construction, and
improvement of mass transportation services; for studies, development, and demonstration
projects related to improved urban transportation; and for relocation payments to persons
affected by mass transportation projects. Recently the federal government made a grant
under Section 6 of the Mass Transportation Act, 78 Stat. 805 (1964), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-11
(1964), to help develop high speed rail transportation between Boston and Washington,
D.C.
The states provide a wide variety of assistance programs. FAINSOD, GORDON & PALAMOUNTAIN, op. cit. supra note 106, at 315. The northeastern states and municipalities have been
most active in this regard. New York, Connecticut and New Jersey have entered into a
compact to create a Regional Transportation Commission. New York has reduced certain
taxes on railroads and has created a New York City Metropolitan Community Transportation Authority with broad power to assist, operate, regulate, and acquire railroad service.
NEw YoRK S.ss. LAws 1965, ch. 324. New Jersey has provided tax relief to passenger facilities, N.J. LAws 1948, ch. 40, has undertaken a study of its tax structure regarding railroads,
Res. 12, 1963 Session, and has created a Transportation Department to control state policy
regarding commuter railroads. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1966, p. 94, col. 6. Connecticut has
authorized municipalities to provide for local railroad passenger stations, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 16-139 (1960), and has granted certain tax exemptions to railroads, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-75 (1960). Vermont has authorized the takeover and operation of the
Rutland Railroad after abandonment was ordered by the ICC, Vt. Laws 1963, Public Act
162, and New Hampshire has authorized municipalities to take certain actions to preserve
threatened rail services. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. 31.4 (1965).
Some states, though, seem to take a different tack. The North Dakota legislature passed
a resolution in 1964 urging that the ICC forestall certain threatened abandonments, and
in 1965 the Montana legislature passed a resolution opposing state ownership or "socialization" of the railroads. House Joint Res. No. 26, in MONT. LAWS 1965.
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come concerned at an appropriately early point, lack the technical
competence or political fortitude to resolve the conflicting claims of the
public and private parties concerned.
In the New Haven case the Commission attempted to improve upon
existing law in this area by introducing two innovations. One was the
establishment of guidelines for the level of assistance to be provided
by the interested political bodies to supplement the carrier's efforts."1
Although the Commission should be commended for trying to hack a
new path through the thicket and for striking out in the right direction,
these guidelines and the type of approach they imply have a fatal flaw:
like the substantive standard of sections 1(18) and 13a of the Act, they
presuppose a case-by-case development of the specific contents of
deliberately vague general standards. An obvious difficulty of such an
approach is that at best a long period will be required to develop
precise, workable standards. A much more serious difficulty is, however, that given the enormous variety of economic and social considerations arising in service withdrawal cases, there is little likelihood of even
the eventual development of standards that will permit the interested
parties to determine their mutual obligations prior to litigation of the
proposed withdrawal before the Commission. Once litigation has begun, of course, any corrective action is too late, unless there are provisions for a series of attempts to divine the appropriate levels of assistance and carrier effort.
The Commission's second innovation in the New Haven case was its
transformation of the customary final decree into an interim order
operating for only eight months, an adjustment that was explicitly
designed to give the parties an opportunity to review the entire situation before any final action was taken."12 This type of action does not
appear to be authorized by the statute. Conceivably, the New Haven
case itself could be defended as a one-shot affair relating to the Commission's declaration of new standards for carrier effort and community
subsidy. But this would be misleading, for the Commission's standards
are so imprecise that even forewarned and well intentioned litigants
probably will not be able fully to comply with them. Nevertheless, the
use of interim opinions, coupled with the determination of precise
standards for carrier effort and community assistance, might form the
basis for one type of workable alternative to the existing system.
One of the most interesting and, perhaps, saddening aspects of the
current rail regulatory picture is the struggle of the Commission to
Ill See text at notes 101-104 supra.
112 New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Discontinuance, 327 I.C.C. 151, 216 (1966). See also discussion at notes 95-96 supra.
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manipulate the existing system to accommodate the concepts and procedures suggested in this article. Unfortunately, the manipulability of
the existing system is limited; and, to the extent the Commission refrains from providing specific guidance to interested parties regarding
their mutual responsibilities in a withdrawal situation, the end of
maximum mobilization of community resources in support of desired
and important rail services is not achieved.
The ProceduralRequirements for Effective Use of Subsidies
If public subsidies are indeed the most equitable and effective means
of preserving certain types of rail passenger services, we must alter our
existing procedures to permit effective use of this type of remedy. Adequate procedures for this purpose would have two features: they
would provide a method for determining the duties of the carrier and
the responsibilities of the subsidy-granting agencies, and they would
make this information known to all interested parties in sufficient
time for the latter to make use of it. The Commission in the New
Haven case tried to graft these features onto the existing system. Its
efforts fell short, however, due to conflict with the existing statutes and
to lack of a method for determining the various parties' duties and responsibilities prior to final adjudication.
Nevertheless, adequate procedures could be devised without doing
untoward violence to existing institutions and methods of political
operation. Central to any adequate procedural system would be the
institution of a preliminary fact-finding hearing as a prerequisite to
any rail service withdrawal. The power to invoke this hearing would
be vested in carriers seeking withdrawal, the Commission itself, and all
other parties having a strong interest in the maintenance or withdrawal
of particular services. The purpose of the hearing would be to ascertain
all of the facts relevant to the future of the services at issue-the financial results of current operations; the existing and potential demand
for the services; the likely impact on the carrier, the users of the services, and other relevant groups of maintaining or withdrawing the
services; the sufficiency of the carrier's efforts to make the services
economically viable; and the amount and apportionment of financial
support, if any, that would have to be forthcoming from interested parties if the services were to be maintained. Parties represented at the
hearing would include the carrier, the users of the services, states, municipalities, and the federal government. The share to be provided by
the federal government would be determined in accordance with the
national interest in maintaining the services, and to this end the Coin-
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mission would be empowered to make the carrier eligible for specified
types of federal assistance. After the Commission's findings were promulgated, the carrier, states, and municipalities would be given time to
take the recommended steps.
Later, any party dissatisfied with the performance of any other party
would be empowered to invoke a second proceeding. At this proceeding the ICC would determine the extent of compliance with its guidelines. If the Commission were to find that its recommendations had
been substantially followed, it would probably order continuance of
the services for a specified period. If it were to find that its recommendations had not been followed, it would be able to utilize a wide range of
remedies. These would include the powers to increase the level of
federal support; order the carrier to assume a somewhat greater
(though statutorily limited) share of the costs of continuing the service;
and to order continuance of services pertaining to groups willing to
undertake their share of the costs, while permitting withdrawal of
services pertaining to groups not so willing. Conceivably, the Commission might be able to persuade some of the parties to increase
their contributions to cover the defaults of others. Finally, it might,
if it were convinced that it had no reasonable alternative, permit withdrawal of some or all of the services at issue. A decision ordering continuance or permitting withdrawal would be appealable in the same
manner as any other final order.
Pros and Cons of the Proposed System
One purpose of this proposed system would be to create within the
concepts and traditions of our existing institutions a regulatory system
imposing the responsibility of supporting rail services on the parties
most affected by them and most capable of providing support. Another
Would be to give the ICC procedural and substantive tools that are sufficiently flexible to cope with the complexity and diversity of the
situations arising in this area. The existing system fulfills neither of
these two purposes: the Commission has only the single remedy of
requiring the carrier to support the services, and it must make its decision to grant or withhold this remedy after only a single, all or nothing,
adjudicatory hearing. Moreover, although interested political units
can and do under the existing system subsidize particular rail services,
the difficulties of coordinating political remedies with the regulatory
process are almost insurmountable.
The proposed system would not avoid, however, the disadvantage
that funds to maintain rail services would still have to be obtained

1967]

Rail Passenger Service

from states and municipalities. The possibility that some political units
affected by the services at issue might not provide sufficient support
would create great difficulties for the Commission. Under ideal conditions it might be possible to discontinue services to nonsupporting
political units while at the same time maintaining services to those
willing to bear their fair share of the burden, or to make up the difference with federal funds. Alternatively, the supporting political units
might be persuaded to increase their ante.
Furthermore, upon first view it might appear that the proposed
system would impose great additional burdens upon the Commission.
Not only would the Commission have to determine the level of support
necessary to maintain the services at issue; it would also have to allocate
responsibilities among the parties involved, and, to the extent that any
of those parties were not to accept their responsibilities, make further
adjustments in the overall scheme. But complexities of this sort stem
from the nature of the problems, and not from the system proposed to
deal with them. Is it not far better to have these decisions made by an
organization with the expertise, experience, and impartiality of the
ICC, than to have them go unmade, or to have them made through a
hit or miss process of haggling among carriers, users, political units, and
regulatory agencies? Besides, under the existing system the Commission
actually makes much the same type of findings it would make under
the proposed system; the only difference is that, instead of having
multiple remedies and a flexible procedure to implement them, the
Commission must make agonizing choices-continuance versus withdrawal, passengers versus freight, commuters versus employees of industries located along unprofitable rail lines--of the sort that confronted and confounded it in the New Haven and Boston & Maine
cases.
An Alternative
An alternative to the system proposed above would be one in which
the ICC itself would provide subsidies to maintain rail passenger services deemed to be of unusual public interest. Such a system would
avoid one disadvantage to the first system; namely, that funds to maintain rail services would have to be obtained from states and municipalities. But against this gain would be the loss of the principle that those
benefiting from given services should pay a substantial portion of the
cost of maintaining those services. This suggests that the alternative
system should be rejected unless it can be demonstrated conclusively
that a combined federal-state-municipal system simply would not work.
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CONCLUSION

If successful, this article has done three things. First, it has demonstrated that, regardless of what the statute appears to say, there is but
a single method of deciding all types of rail service withdrawal cases.
The heart of this method is a rather complex balancing test looking to
the impacts on all affected parties of either continuing or withdrawing
the services at issue. Second, this article has shown that the notion that
the appropriate parties to subsidize money-losing passenger services are
carriers and freight shippers is inequitable and self-defeating. A more
equitable and effective approach would be to impose this burden on
the states and municipalities benefiting from such services. Third, this
article has presented an outline for revising the existing system to permit more effective use of the Commission's abilities to analyze rail
situations, and of states' and municipalities' abilities to provide supporting funds. Under this outline the Commission's first act in any rail
service withdrawal situation would be to hold a fact-finding proceeding
for the purposes of determining the level of support necessary to maintain the services at issue, and of allocating responsibilities among the
parties involved.
Admittedly, this article has not presented a specific proposal for an
alternate system. Before legislation could be enacted, a host of ancillary
questions would have to be answered: should time limits be imposed
on the various stages of the proposed procedure; and, if so, what should
they be? What kind of federal assistance should be available, and how
should the amounts be determined? To what extent should carriers be
obliged to support passenger services with freight revenues? Questions
of this sort could, however, be easily answered as soon as there was general agreement with the propositions presented in this article.

